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The objective of this
study is to examine country-
specific factors that are
related to the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s
(SEC) issuance of foreign-
related Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement
Releases (AAERs). Foreign-
related AAERs include
sanctions issued against
foreign firms registered in
the U.S. and against
domestic firms with foreign
operations. The country-
specific factors examined
include the foreign
countries’ accounting
models, perceived level of
corruption, and relative
economic presence in the
U.S. market. An
investigative bias exists if
the SEC is not investigating
these alternative forms of
risk in proportion to their
existence within these
populations of firms. Failure
to scrutinize any portion of
these firms exposes
stakeholders to the
additional risk of unchecked
intentional misstatements.
Research on the
international investigative
patterns of the SEC is
important for three reasons.
First, multinational
corporations are the fastest
growing population among
publicly-listed firms. In
1988, only 26 foreign firms
were registered with the
SEC. By 1998, this number
had increased to more than
1,100 (SEC Annual Report,
1998). The SEC signaled its
recognition of the rapidly
expanding international
marketplace when it formed
the Office of International
Affairs (OIA) in 1989. The
OIA was given “primary
responsibility for the
negotiation and imple-
mentation of information-
sharing agreements and for
developing legislative and
other initiatives to facilitate
international cooperation”
(SEC Annual Report, 1990:
20). 
Second, fraud is an
expensive international
problem. Worldwide fraud
losses are estimated at five
cents for every dollar spent
(Kerber, 2008). Recognition
of this problem is evident as
early as the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.
Discussing the need for
regulation, the Act
recognizes that securities
prices are established by
transactions throughout
both the U.S. and foreign
countries and that these
prices are susceptible to
manipulation (SEC, 1934).
Evidence of this
manipulation is that
publicly-traded companies
suffer median losses from
fraud of $142,000 per
incidence of fraud (ACFE,
2008).
Third, while the SEC has
important enforcement
responsibilities, it possesses
limited resources. One of
the reasons the SEC was
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formed was “to ensure the
maintenance of fair and
honest markets” (Securities
and Exchange Act, 1934,
Section 2). Although the
SEC is the only organization
within the U.S. government
to generate excess revenues
over expenses, as with any
government entity it must
operate with a limited
amount of resources. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (U.S.
Congress, 2002) recognizes
that the SEC’s resources are
stretched in an increasingly
high risk environment. The
Act requires public
accounting firms to pay to
the SEC both registration
and annual fees, and
issuers to pay annual
accounting support fees to
support the investigative
activities of the Public
Company Accounting
Oversight Board, which is
under the jurisdiction of the
SEC (U.S. Congress, 2002).
Not only must investigative
resources be stretched to
address new and increased
risks, but the costs of
learning how to investigate
within new accounting
models and business
environments uses
resources that would
otherwise be devoted to
investigations.
Given resource
constraints, growth in
international business, and
increasing fraud risk, the
SEC may not be
investigating alternative
forms of risk in proportion
to their existence within the
population of listed firms.
The SEC’s objectives of
prevention and deterrence
are compromised to the
extent that intentional
misstatements are
overlooked for any portion of
the registrant population.
As a first study in this
area, it evaluates whether
accounting models,
corruption, and economic
presence are macro-level
risk factors that explain the
issuance of AAERs, and
whether these relationships
suggest an investigative bias
by the SEC. These three
factors are employed in this
study to represent different
types of risk to an investor,
risk which may threaten the
goal of “the safeguarding of
securities and funds related
thereto” (Securities and
Exchange Act, 1934, Section
2). Anchoring and adjust-
ment theory was used to
predict that the SEC is more
likely to issue AAERs for
companies that use a
familiar, US-based
accounting model than for
companies that use an
unfamiliar model. Use of the
Fair Presentation/Full
Disclosure model— the
same type employed within
the U.S.— is predicted to be
positively related to the
issuance of an AAER. Use of
either the Legal Compliance
or Inflation-Adjusted
accounting models is
predicted to have a negative
relationship with AAER
issuance. The theory of
differential association was
used to predict a positive
relationship between
countries with higher levels
of perceived corruption and
AAER issuance. Finally, a
positive relationship is
predicted for firms with
larger relative market
presence in the U.S.
economy.
This study makes two
contributions to the existing
literature. First, although
prior research (e.g., Beasley
et al., 1999, 2000) evaluates
AAER composition (e.g.,
types of respondents and
misstatements), no study
has tested whether macro-
level risk factors can explain
the SEC’s issuance of
AAERs. Second, while
numerous papers have
discussed the regulatory
environment faced by
foreign firms (e.g., Breeden,
1994; Cochrane, 1994;
Decker, 1994) the literature
lacks study of SEC
investigations of
international firms and tests
for association with unique
risk factors in international
markets. This study’s
results should increase
knowledge in both of these
research areas.
The remainder of the
paper is organized as
follows. The next section
develops the theory and
hypotheses related to the
factors examined for
association with AAERs.
Section III describes
research method. Section IV
presents the results. Section
V discusses implications,
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limitations, and avenues for
future research.
Hypothesis
Development
International Accounting
Models
Three accounting
models are used around the
world— Fair
Presentation/Full
Disclosure, Legal
Compliance, or Inflation-
Adjusted. The U.S. uses the
Fair Presentation/Full
Disclosure accounting
model (Saudagaran, 2001).
The information contained
in the financial reports is
primarily used by external
investors. The reports are
designed to allow external
investors to make fully-
informed investing decisions
(Gernon & Meek, 2001). The
International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB)
uses this model as the
template for developing
internationally-accepted
accounting standards (IASB,
2001).
Countries (e.g., France,
Germany, Japan) that base
their legal systems on code
law use the Legal
Compliance model
(Saudagaran, 2001). The
financial reports prepared in
this system are tailored to
internal investors. This
model is effective in these
countries because the
majority of investment
originates from internal
investors such as large
banks or majority
shareholders who possess
inside knowledge of firm
operations. A one book
system is employed— the
same set of financial
statements for government
and shareholder purposes.
Unlike the Fair Presenta-
tion/Full Disclosure model,
in which presentation
fairness is paramount,
users of this model must
only comply with the
minimum reporting
standards defined by their
government. Whether any
additional reporting takes
place is left to the preparers’
professional judgment. This
format makes income
smoothing acceptable, and
widely used in practice
(Gernon & Meek, 2001).
When these firms agree to
list in the U.S. market, they
agree to abide by the U.S.’s
accounting rules, which
prohibit earnings smoothing
and reserve accounts. What
is acceptable in the home
country is a form of
“manipulation and control”
(Securities and Exchange
Act, 1934, Section 2) that
the SEC must prevent.
Countries facing high
inflation (e.g., Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Israel,
Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay)
generally select the
Inflation-Adjusted model.
This model uses the Fair
Presentation or Legal
Compliance model as a
basis and then adjusts for
inflation using one of two
methods. General
Purchasing Power
Accounting adjusts all
balance sheet items to
reflect the national
currency’s purchasing
power. Current Cost
Accounting recognizes
assets and expenses at their
replacement cost on the
reporting date for the
financial statements (IFAC,
2001).
When investigating
domestic firms, the SEC
works within the Fair
Presentation/Full
Disclosure model in all of its
cases; however,
international investigations
require a change in focus to
three potential models
instead of one. Anchoring
theory suggests that an
individual’s ability to change
focus may be compromised
because decisions are based
upon, or “anchored” on an
initial value (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1986). Given
that all domestic
investigations and many
international investigations
require expertise in the Fair
Presentation/Full
Disclosure model, SEC
enforcement officials should
be anchored to this
accounting model. Shifting
resources from investigating
domestic firms to foreign
firms requires an
adjustment to consider
alternative accounting
models. Previous studies,
both in psychology (e.g.,
Tversky & Kahneman, 1986;
Whyte & Sebenius, 1997)
and in accounting (e.g.,
Kinney & Uecker, 1982;
Biggs & Wild, 1985; Heintz
& White, 1989) have shown
that adjustments can be
insufficient when decisions
are anchored to a particular
option. In this case, an
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insufficient adjustment
would entail enforcement
officials conducting a
significant portion of
international investigations
in countries that employ the
same model as the U.S.. The
cost of this insufficient
adjustment would be the
loss of prevention and
deterrence needed for firms
that use the Legal
Compliance and Inflation-
Adjusted models in their
business activities.
Tversky and Kahneman
(1986) discussed the effects
of anchoring in systems
such as the SEC in which
all components need to
function properly. The
probability of failure for any
one component of the
enforcement system may be
low; however, if one
component fails, the entire
enforcement system fails.
Tversky and Kahneman
found that anchoring bias
led people to underestimate
probabilities of failure in
these types of systems. For
the SEC, this bias would
entail underallocating
investigative resources to
countries employing the
alternative models. This
potentially leads to
investment decisions based
on financial statements
laden with misstatements.
Social decision scheme
theory (Whyte & Sebenius,
1997) provides a basis for
extending individual
anchoring effects to group
settings such as regulators’
investigative choices. In the
first stage of group decision-
making, individuals enter a
group setting with personal
preferences for a particular
alternative (Stasser, 1999).
As group members interact
to reach a decision, a social
decision scheme emerges
where members’ personal
preferences are combined
and a group decision is
reached (Hinsz, 1999).
Whyte & Sebenius (1997)
studied the effect of multiple
anchors on group judgment
and found consistent
anchoring and adjustment
bias in group decisions as
well as individual
judgments. 
In the context of this
study, SEC enforcement
officials should be anchored
to investigating the Fair
Presentation/Full
Disclosure accounting
model because of their
extensive experience and
familiarity with the model.
Conversely, such anchoring
and adjustment bias should
lead to the underinvestiga-
tion of alternative
accounting models. Stated
formally:
H1: The use of the Fair
Presentation/Full
Disclosure model
within a country will
be positively related
to the issuance of
AAERs.
H2: The use of the Legal
Compliance model
within a country will
be negatively related
to the issuance of
AAERs.
H3: The use of the
Inflation-Adjusted
model within a
country will be
negatively related to
the issuance of
AAERs.
Corruption 
The second country-
specific factor that presents
a risk to shareholders is
corruption. Cross-country
evaluation of corruption
levels is an emerging topic
in the accounting literature
(Kimbro, 2002). The
pervasiveness of corruption
is not uniform across
countries (Transparency
International, 2001). The
theory of differential
association (Wells, 1997)
suggests that a more
comprehensive process of
learning criminal behavior
occurs in countries with
higher levels of corruption.
Individuals within these
countries learn how to
commit crimes and
rationalize their criminal
behavior. 
The level of corruption in
a country includes both the
frequency of corruption and
the total value of bribes paid
(Transparency International,
2001). Therefore, as the
level of corruption
increases, so does the risk
of doing business in that
country. In a country with
more corruption, legitimate
business efforts have a
higher probability of being
affected by corrupt
activities. 
In order to measure and
evaluate corruption risk,
enforcement officials need a
valid measure of relative
corruption across countries.
One such measure is
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Transparency Inter-
national’s Corruption
Perception Index
(Transparency International,
2001). This composite index
provides a relative ranking
of countries based upon
surveys conducted with
business people and risk
analysts. If the SEC is
evaluating and responding
to corruption risk, then
more foreign-related AAERs
will be issued against firms
in countries with higher
levels of perceived
corruption, ceteris paribus.
Stated formally:
H4: The level of perceived
corruption within a
country will be
positively related to
the issuance of
AAERs.
Economic Presence 
The final country-
specific factor that presents
a risk to shareholders is the
relative economic effect a
country has upon the U.S.
economy. When foreign
firms register stock in the
U.S., their activities become
part of the U.S. economy. As
more firms from a foreign
country register and operate
within the U.S., that
country’s impact on the U.S.
economy increases.
Alternatively, the more
business U.S. firms conduct
in a foreign country, the
greater the influence that
country has on the U.S.
economy. In response, the
SEC should adjust their
investigative strategy to
provide adequate assurance
to stakeholders. Therefore,
ceteris paribus, the greater
a relative influence a
country has on the U.S.
economy, the greater the
enforcement resources that
need to be devoted to
investigate activities within
that country.
Using these relative
measures of economic
presence for foreign
registrants and the foreign
operations of U.S. firms, the
final two hypotheses are the
following:
H5: The percentage of
total foreign
registrants will be
positively related to
the issuance of
foreign registrant
AAERs.
H6: The percentage of
total U.S. exports
will be positively
related to the
issuance of foreign
operation AAERs.
Method
Sample 
The original sample
consists of AAERs from
1982-2003. AAERs were
first issued in 1982
beginning with AAER No. 1,
and 2003 ends with AAER
No. 1936, for a total of
1,936 records. The full text
of each AAER was obtained
from the SEC Accounting
Rules manuals (SEC, 1982-
2003). Each AAER was
studied to determine if a
foreign firm or foreign
operation was involved in
the allegations. A foreign
registrant is defined as a
foreign issuer, a company
whose stock is traded in the
United States but is owned
by foreign interests. Foreign
operations of U.S.
corporations is defined here
as a wholly-owned foreign
subsidiary, or foreign sales,
financing, or licensing
agreements. 
To be included in the
sample, a specific country
must be named, and
activities within the country
must be involved in the
allegations. Additionally, the
country’s accounting model
must be known by the IASB.
In a few cases, more than
one country was involved in
the charges. When this
occurred, the countries were
separated into two
observations and assigned
their own accounting model.
A small number of AAERs
were excluded because of
ambiguous information
about geographic location. A
total of 1587 AAERs were
excluded because they
involve domestic
allegations—misconduct by
U.S. firms within the U.S.. 
The Corruption
Perception Index (CPI)
(Transparency International,
2001) ranks and measures
91 countries on a
continuous scale from one
to ten. A higher index score
indicates less corruption.
For a country to be included
in the survey, at least three
of the seven contributing
sources must provide data
about that country. If a
country is not listed in the
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CPI, its index score is
estimated as the average of
countries within its
geographic region as defined
by Transparency
International. 
Two measures of
economic presence are
needed given the two
categories of foreign firms
under examination. For
foreign registrants, the
measure of economic
presence is the percentage
of total foreign registrants
that are from that particular
country. For example, in the
year 2002, 899 foreign
registrants were listed on
the New York Stock
Exchange, NASDAQ, and
the American Stock
Exchange combined (NYSE,
NASDAQ, AMEX, 2002). For
each country, the number of
foreign registrants from that
country divided by the total
number of foreign
registrants (i.e., 899)
provides a relative measure
of foreign registrant
presence. Each country
must have listed foreign
registrants on the NYSE,
NASDAQ, or AMEX during
the year 2002 to remain in
the sample.
For the foreign
operations of U.S. firms
category, a relative measure
can be provided by total
U.S. exports. The Office of
Trade and Economic
Analysis provides the
“Global Distribution of U.S.
Exports” (2001). In the year
2001, U.S. exports totaled
$731 billion. The relative
measure is calculated as a
country’s specific U.S.
export level divided by total
U.S. exports. Each country
must have received U.S.
exports in the year 2001 to
remain in the sample. 
Ultimately, the final sample
included 276 AAER
observations. 
Model 
Regression analysis was
performed using the
following equation:
AAERi = bo + b1AM + b2CPIi +
b3I1REGi + b4 I2OPSi + ei (1)
where:
AAERi = the number of
AAERs issued against
companies from or working
in country i within each
category type;
bo = the intercept term;
AM = a categorical variable
which designates the
accounting model the
country employs (i.e., Fair
Presentation/Full
Disclosure, Legal
Compliance, or Inflation-
Adjusted);
CPIi = the Corruption
Perception Index Score for
country i;
I1 = an indicator variable
that equals one if the AAERs
are in the foreign registrants
category and zero otherwise; 
REGi = the percentage of
total foreign registrants for
country i;
I2 = an indicator variable
that equals one if the AAERs
are in the foreign operations
category and zero otherwise;
and
OPSi = the percentage of
total U.S. exports for
country i.
The hypotheses suggest
that the regression coeffi-
cients b3 and b4 will be
positive while b2 will be
negative. If b1 is significant,
which is the prediction, then
further analyses will
determine whether each of
the accounting models
within this categorical
variable individually make a
significant contribution and
do so in their hypothesized
direction. 
Results
Descriptive Results 
Of the 276 cases found
in the 1982-2003 AAER
population, 223 (81%) fall in
the foreign operations
category. The remaining 53
(19%) comprise the foreign
registrant category. Table 1
breaks these cases out by
year. In 1982, 1983, 1989
and 1990, all of the AAERs
were filed against domestic
firms. No foreign registrants
were targeted for
investigation until 1995. In
this same year, a similar
statistically significant
increase in attention to
foreign operations is present
as well (one-tailed t-test, p <
0.01). Foreign AAERs
represent the largest 
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Table 1
AAERs Citing Foreign Registrants and Foreign Operations of U.S. Corporations by Year
1982-2003
Year*
Number of Foreign Registrant
AAERs
Number of Foreign Operations
AAERs
1982 0 0
1983 0 0
1984 0 3
1985 0 1
1986 0 3
1987 0 1
1988 0 1
1989 0 0
1990 0 0
1991 0 3
1992 0 2
1993 0 4
1994 0 5
1995 1 8
1996 4 14
1997 2 18
1998 7 18
1999 8 17
2000 5 19
2001 9 34
2002 7 39
2003 13 40
*1982 is the first year the SEC issued AAERs, beginning with AAER No. 1. 2003 AAERs
conclude with AAER No. 1936.
percentage of annual AAERs
in 2001, at 40 percent of the
total number filed.
Table 2 presents the 45
countries targeted in
foreign-related AAERs. The
first two columns list each
country and the accounting
model used. 60 percent of
the countries in the sample
utilize the Fair
Presentation/Full
Disclosure accounting
model, 26 percent use the
Legal Compliance
accounting model, and 14
percent use the Inflation-
Adjusted accounting model.
The corruption results
indicate that the countries
in the sample have an
average CPI score of 5.2 (SD
= 2.4). Singapore, Canada,
and the Netherlands are
perceived to be the least
corrupt countries, with
scores of 9.2, 8.9, and 8.8
respectively. Nigeria,
Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and
Bolivia are perceived to be
the most corrupt countries,
with scores of 1.0, 1.9, 2.0,
and 2.0 respectively. The
last column presents the
number of AAERs in which
each country is named.
Canada ranks first with 36
cites. Fellow NAFTA cohort
Mexico and trading partners
the United Kingdom and
Japan rank in the top five
with 11, 22, and 16
respectively. A bit surprising
is the lack of AAERs issued
against other European
Union countries, which have
been part of the U.S.
economy since the Marshall
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Plan. Italy, France, and
Germany only garner three,
four, and five AAERs
respectively over the 22 year
period. 
The economic presence
variables are made up of
two categories, foreign
registrants and foreign
operations. Canada
dominates the foreign
registrants category, with
firms from Canada
comprising 22 percent of the
foreign registrant
population. Overall,
countries involved in AAERs
comprise 47 percent of the
total foreign registrant
population. Countries
involved in foreign
operations AAERs account
for 84 percent of total U.S.
exports. NAFTA trading
partners comprise 36
percent of all exports, with
22 percent going to Canada
and 14 percent to Mexico.
The United Kingdom is the
third largest trading partner
involved in foreign
operations AAERs,
accepting 10 percent of all
U.S. exports.
The foreign registrant
results indicate that none of
the AAER firms reside in
Inflation-Adjusted user
countries. A majority (62%)
of the foreign registrants
investigated used the Fair
Presentation/Full
Disclosure accounting
model. The remaining 38
percent employed the Legal
Compliance model. The Chi-
square goodness-of-fit test
examines whether or not the
accounting models are
investigated with equal
frequency. The results (c2=
31.28, p < 0.01) indicate
that investigations occur
predominantly in Fair
Presentation/Full
Disclosure user countries.
In the foreign operations
category, the Fair
Presentation/Full
Disclosure model again
holds the majority and
significantly dominates
investigations (c2= 72.98, p
< 0.01).
Results of Hypothesis
Testing 
The regression equation
outlined above contains
both qualitative (categorical
variable AM) and
quantitative variables. Given
this, a General Linear
Regression Model (GLM) is
the appropriate choice of
regression analysis (Neter et
al., 1996). Ordinary Least
Squares Regression (OLS)
would not be optimal in this
situation because with a
categorical indicator
variable, sometimes referred
to as allocated codes,
numbers are arbitrarily
assigned to variables within
the category (e.g., 1 = Fair
Presentation/Full
Disclosure, 2 = Legal
Compliance, 3 = Inflation-
Adjusted). Within OLS, the
theoretical assumption
underlying allocated codes
is that the change in the
mean response from one
category, in this case
accounting model, to
another is of equal distance
between these three
categories. GLM regression
does not make this
assumption when using a
categorical, or class,
variable (Neter et al., 1996).
In addition, although the
AAER data is gathered over
multiple years, as is
reflected in Table 1, this
time-series data is evaluated
in a cross-sectional manner.
The dependent variable is a
count of the number of
AAERs attributed to a
country over the time
period—not year by year,
but in the aggregate, as is
reflected in Table 2. Hence,
given that the data is not
panel data, GLM estimation
is used and not Generalized
Least Squares. This
approach also results in no
risk of serial correlation. 
GLM regression is used
to prove whether the overall
model and its variables are
significant. If the AM
categorical variable is
significant, additional
analyses will be necessary
to prove H1, H2, and H3
individually. Here, the
Tukey Test for significant
differences between classes
can be used, as well as
Partial F-testing using
dummy indicator variables
(Lomax, 2001). The
complete variance-
covariance matrix shows
that covariances range from
-0.21 (Legal Compliance vs.
Inflation-Adjusted
accounting models) to 0.37
(AAER vs. REG). Lomax
(2001) suggests that a
moderate level of correlation
exists at the 0.50 (or -0.50
for a negative) level.
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Table 2
Countries with Foreign-Related AAERs
Country Accounting Model1 CPI Score2 Number of AAERs
Antigua FP  3.5† 1
Argentina IA 3.5 4
Australia FP 8.5 8
Azerbaijan FP 2.0 2
Bahamas FP  3.5† 7
Belgium LC 6.6 5
Bolivia IA 2.0 8
Brazil IA 4.0 18
British Virgin Islands FP  3.5† 9
Bulgaria FP 3.9 1
Canada FP 8.9 36
Cayman Islands FP  3.5† 1
Chile IA 7.5 6
Columbia FP 3.8 3
Costa Rica FP 4.5 4
France LC 6.7 4
Germany LC 7.4 5
Hong Kong FP 7.9 7
India FP 2.7 5
Indonesia FP 1.9 7
Ireland FP 7.5 3
Israel IA 7.6 1
Italy LC 5.5 3
Ivory Coast LC 2.4 2
Japan LC 7.1 16
Liberia LC  2.3† 5
Liechtenstein LC 7.6 1
Luxembourg LC 8.7 7
Malaysia FP 5.0 4
Mexico IA 3.7 11
Netherlands3 FP 8.8 7
Nigeria FP 1.0 8
Peru IA 4.1 3
Philippines FP 2.9 2
Republic of Palau FP  6.6† 2
Russia FP 2.3 9
Singapore FP 9.2 4
South Africa FP 4.8 1
South Korea LC 4.2 3
Spain LC 7.0 1
Switzerland LC 8.4 6
Taiwan FP 5.9 6
Thailand FP 3.2 3
United Kingdom FP 8.3 22
Venezuela FP 2.8 5
Total Number of Countries 45
Total Number of AAERs 276
Mean 5.2
Table 2
(continued)
Country Accounting Model1 CPI Score2 Number of AAERs
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Standard Deviation 2.4
Notes:
1FP = Fair Presentation/Full Disclosure accounting model used.
IA = Inflation-Adjusted accounting model used.
LC = Legal Compliance accounting model used.
2The Corruption Perception Index ranks countries on a zero to ten scale. A high score indicates
low corruption while a low score indicates high corruption. Finland leads the 2001 survey with
the lowest corruption score (9.9). Bangladesh has the highest corruption score of the 91 ranked
countries (0.4).
3Netherlands includes Netherlands Antilles.
Table 3 presents the results
of both the GLM regression
and supplemental analyses.
In the GLM regression, the
overall R2 for the regression
equation is 0.46 (F statistic
= 8.60, p-value < 0.01),
suggesting a statistically
significant relationship
between the variables of
interest and the issuance of
AAERs. The results provide
support for a significant
relationship between the AM
category as a whole and the
issuance of AAERs, with a
Partial F-statistic of 3.22
and a p-value of 0.04. This
significant result permits
further analysis of each
individual accounting
model. The first
supplemental analysis to
determine if there is a
significant difference
between the Fair
Presentation/Full
Disclosure, Legal
Compliance, and Inflation-
Adjusted models is the
Tukey Test. The Tukey Test
provides a post hoc,
pairwise comparison of
means to test for significant
differences (Lomax, 2001).
Results show a significant
difference between the Fair
Presentation/Full
Disclosure and Legal
Compliance accounting
models at the p-value = 0.05
significance level. The Tukey
Test is a conservative test
(Lomax, 2001), so Partial F-
testing is warranted to see if
the Inflation-Adjusted model
is also contributing to the
significant results in the
GLM regression. Using
dummy indicator variables,
Partial F-testing provides
evidence that the Inflation-
Adjusted model is
significant with a Partial F-
statistic of 12.06 and a p-
value < 0.01. In addition,
this type of testing provides
individual signs on the
coefficients, which allows
conclusions to be drawn on
H1, H2, and H3. For H1, the
sign is positive as predicted
and significant, with a
Partial F-statistic of 9.30
and a p-value < 0.01. For
H2, the sign is negative as
predicted and significant,
with a Partial F-statistic of
4.24 and a p-value of 0.04. 
Support for these
hypotheses provides
evidence that the SEC
appears anchored in the
Fair Presentation/Full
Disclosure accounting
model. As mentioned above,
the Inflation-Adjusted model
is significant; however, its
coefficient is positive, which
is in the opposite direction
than that predicted in H3.
As described earlier,
countries that employ this
model can choose either of
the other two accounting
models as the underlying
model and then adjust for
inflation. If a majority of the
countries in the sample
have the Fair
Presentation/Full
Disclosure accounting
model as the underlying
model, then this positive
relationship to AAER
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Table 3
Regression Results
AAERi = bo + b1AM + b2 CPIi + b3I1REGi + b4 I2OPSi + ei
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Sign Partial F-statistic p-value
AM  3.22  0.04
CPI - -  6.39  0.01
REG + +  7.28 <0.01
OPS + +  22.89  <0.01
Supplemental
Analysis:
FP + + 9.30 <0.01
LC - - 4.24  0.04
IA - + 12.06  <0.01
Full Model:
R-Square 0.46
F-statistic
p-value
8.60
<0.01
Variable Definitions:
AAERi = the number of AAERs issued against companies from or working within country i
within each category type;
bo = the intercept term;
AM = a categorical variable which designates the accounting model the country employs
(i.e., Fair Presentation/Full Disclosure, Legal Compliance, or Inflation-Adjusted);
CPIi =  the Corruption Perception Index Score for country i;
I1 = an indicator variable that equals one if the AAERs are in the foreign registrants
category and zero otherwise;
REGi = the percentage of total foreign registrants for country i; 
I2 = an indicator variable that equals one if the AAERs are in the foreign operations
category and zero otherwise;
OPSi = the percentage of total U.S. exports for country i;
FP = an indicator variable that equals one if the country employs the Fair
Presentation/Full Disclosure accounting model and zero otherwise;
LC = an indicator variable that equals one if the country employs the Legal Compliance
accounting model and zero otherwise; and
IA = an indicator variable that equals one if the country employs the Inflation-Adjusted
accounting model and zero otherwise.
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issuance could provide
explanation for this result. 
The results support the
H4 prediction that the
issuance of AAERs would be
inversely related to a
country’s Corruption
Perception Index score. The
Partial F-statistic of 6.39
and p-value of 0.01 suggest
that a country’s corruption
level is a risk factor that is
systematically addressed in
investigations that result in
AAERs. 
The economic presence
results provide support for
H5 and H6. Specifically, the
H5 results suggest a
positive relationship
between a country’s
percentage of foreign
registrants and the issuance
of AAERs. The Partial F-
statistic on the REG variable
is 7.28 (p-value < 0.01). H6
predicted a positive
relationship between a
country’s percentage of U.S.
exports and the issuance of
foreign operations AAERs.
The Partial F-statistic on the
OPS variable is 22.89 (p-
value < 0.01). Support for
these hypotheses provides
evidence of a positive
relationship between the
economic presence a
country has in the U.S.
economy and the issuance
of AAERs.
Sensitivity Analysis 
Given the US’s significant
business relationship with
Canada, the possibility
exists that the AAERs
involving Canada could be
driving the regression
results. To address this
question, the same
regression was performed
without Canada in the
sample. This change
eliminates 20 AAERs from
the foreign registrant
sample and 16 AAERs from
the foreign operations
sample. The results are
presented in Table 4.
The regression equation’s
R2 remains significant, but
it decreases from 0.46 to
0.31 (F statistic = 4.38, p <
0.01). The results continue
to provide support for the
relationship between the AM
categorical variable and the
issuance of AAERs (Partial
F-statistic = 3.47, p-value =
0.03). As with our full
sample testing, this
significant result warrants
further testing within the
AM category. The Tukey
Test again demonstrates a
significant difference
between the Fair
Presentation/Full
Disclosure and Legal
Compliance accounting
models at the p-value = 0.05
significance level. Partial F-
testing demonstrates that
the Inflation-Adjusted model
also contributes to the
category’s significance, with
a Partial F-statistic of 9.78
and a p-value < 0.01. Using
indicator variables again
provides support for H1 and
H2. H1 is positive and
significant, with a Partial F-
statistic of 9.18 and a p-
value < 0.01. H2 is negative
and significant, with a
Partial F-statistic of 3.45
and a p-value of 0.06.
Consistent with the full
sample testing, support for
these hypotheses provides
evidence that the SEC
appears anchored in the
Fair Presentation/Full
Disclosure accounting
model. As mentioned above
the Inflation-Adjusted model
is significant, but as before
its coefficient is in the
opposite direction than
predicted in H3.
One difference in the
regression results is that H4
is unsupported (Partial F-
statistic = 0.70, p-value =
0.41). There is no significant
relationship between a
country’s corruption level
and the issuance of AAERs.
Another difference between
the two regression results is
in the foreign registrant
economic presence
variables. In the original
regression the coefficients
for both REG and OPS were
highly significant,
supporting H5 and H6;
however, when Canada is
removed from the sample
the foreign registrant
presence variable becomes
insignificant (Partial F-
statistic = 1.15, p-value =
0.29). Beyond Canada,
results provide evidence
that economic presence is
not related to
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Table 4
Regression Results Excluding Canadian AAERs
AAERi = bo + b1AM + b2 CPIi + b3I1REGi + b4 I2OPSi + ei
Variable
Predicted
Sign
Coefficient
Sign
Partial
F-statistic p-value
AM  3.47  0.04
CPI - -  0.70  0.41
REG + +  1.15  0.29
OPS + +  13.08  <0.01
Supplemental
Analysis:
FP + + 9.18 <0.01
LC - - 3.45  0.06
IA - + 9.78  <0.01
Full Model:
R-Square 0.31
F-statistic
p-value
4.38
<0.01
Variable Definitions:
AAERi = the number of AAERs issued against companies from or working within
country i within each category type;
bo = the intercept term;
AM = a categorical variable which designates the accounting model the country
employs (i.e., Fair Presentation/Full Disclosure, Legal Compliance, or
Inflation-Adjusted);
CPIi = the Corruption Perception Index Score for country i;
I1 = an indicator variable that equals one if the AAERs are in the foreign
registrants category and zero otherwise;
REGi = the percentage of total foreign registrants for country i; 
I2 = an indicator variable that equals one if the AAERs are in the foreign
operations category and zero otherwise;
OPSi = the percentage of total U.S. exports for country i;
FP = an indicator variable that equals one if the country employs the Fair
Presentation/Full Disclosure accounting model and zero otherwise;
LC = an indicator variable that equals one if the country employs the Legal
Compliance accounting model and zero otherwise; and
IA = an indicator variable that equals one if the country employs the Inflation-
Adjusted accounting model and zero otherwise;
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the issuance of AAERs for
foreign registrants. With
respect to the foreign
operations of U.S.
registrants, this economic
presence hypothesis (H6) is
still supported even when
Canada is removed from the
analysis (Partial F-statistic =
13.08, p-value < 0.01).
There remains a positive
relationship between the
economic presence a
country has in the U.S.
economy and the issuance
of AAERs.
Implications,
Limitations, and
Future Research
The results of this study
have implications for policy,
practice, and research.
From an investigative policy
perspective, the SEC
appears anchored in the
Fair Presentation/Full
Disclosure accounting
model, and cognizant of the
effect that foreign operations
of domestic firms have on
the U.S. economy.
Adjustments are evident
with respect to varying
corruption levels, although
this result appears to be
driven by the AAERs issued
against Canadian firms. In
addition, other than these
AAERs issued against
Canadian firms, the SEC
does not appear to be
sensitive to the economic
presence foreign registrant
countries have within the
U.S. market. This suggests
the SEC has recognized
Canadian firms’ impact on
the US’s economy and
financial markets and has
properly adjusted its
investigative focus to
address risks from this
segment of the population;
however, the SEC has not
made a similar adjustment
with respect to corruption,
and to other foreign firms
that have a significant
impact on our economy.
Even with major trading
partners such as Mexico
and the United Kingdom,
stakeholders in foreign firms
that conduct business in
these countries may face
exposure to unchecked,
intentional misstatements;
however, findings of an
investigative bias in favor of
the US-based accounting
model remain robust
regardless of Canada’s
inclusion in the analysis.
From a practice
perspective, if the SEC
conducts a cost-benefit
analysis, the results may
suggest that hiring or
training additional
investigators to work with
alternative accounting
models would help deter
fraud and increase
enforcement profits. With
increased coverage, more
attention also can be paid to
countries with higher levels
of corruption and economic
presence. 
As a first study in this
area, this research
demonstrates the
relationship between macro-
level, country-specific risk
factors and the issuance of
AAERs. Future research
that expands upon these
risk factors can take various
forms. For example, when
situations subject to these
foreign AAERs later result in
litigation by investors who
claim to have been
defrauded, one could
examine how the legal
outcomes differ from their
domestic counterparts, and
how enforceable in these
situations the court rulings
become. Alternatively, with
the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (U.S.
Congress, 2002), the volume
of enforcement actions likely
will increase significantly.
Requirements of the Act
could be examined to
predict future country-
specific investigative
associations. 
This study has three
major limitations. First,
when studying fraud, cases
have to be both detected
and disclosed to become
public knowledge.
Accordingly, the true
distribution of fraud is
unobservable. Second,
AAERs involve investiga-
tions that are publicly
announced. The distribution
of enforcement investiga-
tions that do not reach this
stage is private information
held by the SEC. AAERs
could have a different
distribution, which would
affect policy implications for
the enforcement division.
Finally, the distribution of
accounting models around
the world is undergoing a
significant shift. In 2005,
the European Union
required public firms to
follow International
Accounting Standards. In
addition, the SEC is
currently considering
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converging U.S. GAAP to the
International Accounting
Standards. This prospective
change will affect
enforcement policy in the
coming years.
Endnotes
1. In the U.S. alone, the
Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners
estimates that losses
from occupational fraud
and abuse has risen
from $400 billion in
1996 to $994 billion in
2008 (ACFE, 2008).
2. The SEC broadened its
investigative net in
response to the growth
of the international
marketplace.
Throughout the 1990’s,
the SEC entered into
reciprocal agreements
to share evidence with
other countries which
provide access to
information and
evidence. In 1989, the
SEC made 101 requests
for investigative
assistance to foreign
governments. In the
same year, 150
requests for assistance
were made by foreign
governments to the SEC
(SEC Annual Report,
1990). By 1999,
requests to foreign
governments increased
to 275 and requests by
foreign governments
inflated to 412 (SEC
Annual Report, 1998).
 
3. The Fair Presentation/
Full Disclosure model is
also called the Anglo-
Saxon or British-
American model.
Countries that base
their legal system on
common law use this
model. The Legal
Compliance model is
also called the
Continental model.
4. Tversky and Kahneman
(1986) refer to
structures such as
these as disjunctive
structures.
5. The institutions that
contribute data to
compile this index
include the World
Economic Forum, the
World Business
Environment Survey of
the World Bank, the
Institute of Manage-
ment Development,
Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers, the Political
and Economic Risk
Consultancy, the
Economist Intelligence
Unit, and Freedom
House’s Nations in
Transit. Countries are
ranked on a continuous
zero to ten scale, with
higher scores indicating
less perceived
corruption.
6. For example, Canadian
firms comprise the
largest segment of
foreign registrants on a
country-by-country
basis. In addition, the
greatest portion of U.S.
exports is to Canada.
7. For example, the IASB
issued a request for
information about the
accounting systems
within Nicaragua and
Saudi Arabia (IASB,
2002). Nicaragua has
four AAERs, while
Saudi Arabia has five
AAERs. These
observations are
excluded from the
sample. 
8. Finland leads the 2001
survey with the least
corruption and a score
of 9.9. Bangladesh is
listed as the country
with the most
corruption, ranked 91
with an index score of
0.4. Western European
countries, Canada, and
the U.S. dominate the
higher rankings. For
example, Canada is
ranked seventh with a
score of 8.9; the United
Kingdom is ranked 13th
with a score of 8.3; and
the U.S. is ranked 16th
(and tied with Israel)
with an index score of
7.6. 
9. The results do not
change when these
countries are excluded
from the analysis.
10. Seven AAERs from
Dubai and two AAERs
from Cyprus were
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excluded because
neither country has
listed foreign
registrants in the year
2002.
11. One AAER from
Northern Mariana
Island was excluded
because there were no
U.S. exports to the
country in the year
2001. Results are not
significantly different
when this observation
is included and its
imports of zero for the
year 2001 are included.
12. Coefficient b3 is
predicted to be negative
because the CPI score
is inversely related to
corruption levels.
13. Neter et al (1985)
suggest that Variance
Inflation Factors (VIFs)
greater than 10 indicate
a multicollinearity
problem. All of the VIFs
are less than 1.4.
14. Results are not
significantly different
when the averaged CPI
scores are excluded.
References
American Stock Exchange
(2001). Equities, listed
companies, inter-
national. www.amex
.com/cmnprodlkp.jsp.
Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners (2008).
2008 report to the nation:
Occupational
fraud and abuse.
Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners
(ACFE).
Beasley, M.S., Carcello,
J.V., & Hermanson, D.R.
(2000). Fraud-related sec
enforcement actions
against auditors: 1987-
1997. American Institute
of Certified Public
Accountants.
Beasley, M.S., Carcello, J.V,
& Hermanson, D.R.
(1999). Fraudulent
financial reporting: 1987-
1997; an analysis of U.S.
public companies.
American Institute of
Certified Public
Accountants.
Biggs, S.F. & Wild, J.J.
(1985). An investigation
of auditor judgment in
analytical review. The
Accounting Review, 60,
607-633.
Breeden, R.C. (1994).
Foreign companies and
U.S. securities markets
in a time of economic
transformation. Fordham
International Law
Journal. Symposium,
77-96.
Black, H.C. (1979). Black’s
law dictionary (5th
edition). Eagan, MN:
West Publishing
Company.
Butler, S.A. (1986).
Anchoring in the
judgmental evaluation of
audit samples. The
Accounting Review, 61,
101-111.
Cochrane, J.L. (1994). Are
U.S. regulatory
requirements for foreign
firms appropriate?
Fordham International
Law Journal.
Symposium, 58-67.
Davia, H.R. (2000). Fraud
101: Techniques for
strategy and detection.
Hoboken, NJ: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Decker, W.E. (1994). The
attractions of the U.S.
securities markets to
foreign issuers and the
alternative methods of
accessing the U.S.
markets: From the
issuer’s perspective.
Fordham International 
Law Journal.
Symposium, 10-24.
Gernon, H. & Meek, G.K.
(2001). Accounting: An
international perspective
(5th edition). Columbus,
OH: Irwin/ McGraw-Hill.
Haskins, M.E., Ferris, K.R.,
& Selling, T.I. (2000).
International Financial
reporting and analysis: A
contextual emphasis (2nd
edition). Columbus, OH:
Irwin/McGraw-Hill.
Heintz, J.A. & White, G.B.
(1989). Auditor judg-
ment in analytical
review: Some further
evidence. Auditing: A
Southern Business Review Winter 2009 17
Journal of Practice &
Theory, 8, 22-39.
Hinsz, V.B. (1999). Group
decision making with
responses of a
quantitative nature: The
theory of social decision
schemes for quantities.
Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision
Processes. Vol. 80, No.
1, 28-49.
International Accounting
Standards Board (2002).
IAS around the world.
www.iasc.org.uk.
International Federation of
Accountants (2001).
Financial reporting in
hyperinflationary
economies. International
Federation of
Accountants (IFAC).
Kerber, R. (2008). Could
this chip have prevented
the TJX breach? The
Boston Globe, August
31, 2008.
Kimbro, M.B. (2002). A
cross-country empirical
investigation of
corruption and its
relationship to
economic, cultural, and
monitoring institutions:
An examination of the
role of accounting and
financial statements
quality. Journal of
Accounting, Auditing,
and Finance, Vol. 17,
Issue 4, 325-375.
Kinney, W.R. & Uecker,
W.C. (1982). Mitigating
the consequences of
anchoring in auditor
judgments. The
Accounting Review, 57,
55-69.
Lambsdorff, J.G. (2001).
Transparency
international 2001
corruption perceptions
index. Global Corruption
Report 2001.
Transparency
International.
Lomax, R.G. (2001). An
introduction to statistical
concepts for education
and behavioral sciences.
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
NASDAQ Stock Market
(2002). NASDAQ
International Companies.
www
.nasdaq.com/about/non
usoutput_ao.stm.
Neter, J., Kutner, M.,
Nachtsheim, C., &
Wasserman, W. (1996).
Applied linear regression
models (3rd edition).
Homewood, IL: Irwin.
Neter, J., Wasserman, W., &
Kutner, M. (1985).
Applied statistical models
(2nd edition). Homewood,
IL: Irwin.
New York Stock Exchange
(2002). Complete list of
non-U.S. companies—
2002. www.nyse.com
/pdfs/forlist020703.pdf.
Saks, M. & Kidd, R.F.
(1986). Human
information processing
and adjudication: Trial
by heuristics. Judgment
and Decision Making: An
interdisciplinary reader.
Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University
Press.
Saudagaran, S.M. (2001).
International accounting:
A user perspective.
Boston, MA: South-
Western College
Publishing, Thompson
Learning.
Securities & Exchange
Commission (1982-
1998). 1982-1998
annual reports.
Washington, DC: SEC.
Securities & Exchange
Commission (1982-
2003). SEC accounting
rules. Washington, DC:
SEC.
Stasser, G. (1999). A primer
of social decision
scheme theory: Models
of group influence,
competitive model-
testing, and prospective
modeling. Organi-
zational Behavior and
Human Decision
Processes. Vol. 80, No.
1, 3-20.
Transparency International
(2001). Global Corruption
report 2001.
Transparency
International.
18 Winter 2009 Southern Business Review
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D.
(1986). Judgment under
uncertainty: Heuristics
and biases. Judgment
and Decision Making: An
inter-disciplinary reader.
Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University
Press.
United States Congress
(2002). Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. Washington, DC:
United States Congress.
Wells, J.T. (1997).
Occupational fraud and
abuse. London, UK:
Obsidian Publishing
Company, Inc.
Whyte, G. & Sebenius, J.K.
(1997). The effect of
multiple anchors on
anchoring in individual
and group judgment.
Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision
Processes, Volume 69,
Issue 1, 74-85.
Copyright of Southern Business Review is the property of Georgia Southern University, College of Business
Administration and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the
copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.
